Picture 1 of 1
Jean-Charles Rochet Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? (Hardback)
Another great item from Rarewaves USA | Free delivery!
Condition:
8 available
Shipping:
Located in: 60502, United States
Delivery:
Varies
Returns:
Payments:
Shop with confidence
Seller information
- 97.7% positive feedback
Registered as a Business Seller
Seller assumes all responsibility for this listing.
eBay item number:335266338833
Item specifics
- Condition
- Book Title
- Why Are There So Many Banking Crises?
- Publication Name
- Why Are There So Many Banking Crises?
- Title
- Why Are There So Many Banking Crises?
- Subtitle
- The Politics and Policy of Bank Regulation
- Format
- Hardcover
- ISBN-10
- 0691131465
- EAN
- 9780691131467
- ISBN
- 9780691131467
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Genre
- Law, Business & Economics, Political Science
- Topic
- Banks & Banking, Banking, Public Policy / Economic Policy
- Release Year
- 2008
- Release Date
- 23/01/2008
- Language
- English
- Country/Region of Manufacture
- US
- Item Height
- 1in
- Item Length
- 9.5in
- Item Weight
- 20 oz
- Publication Year
- 2008
- Type
- Textbook
- Item Width
- 6.5in
- Number of Pages
- 320 Pages
About this product
Product Information
Almost every country in the world has sophisticated systems to prevent banking crises. Yet such crises--and the massive financial and social damage they can cause--remain common throughout the world. Does deposit insurance encourage depositors and bankers to take excessive risks? Are banking regulations poorly designed? Or are banking regulators incompetent? Jean-Charles Rochet, one of the world's leading authorities on banking regulation, argues that the answer in each case is "no." In Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? , he makes the case that, although many banking crises are precipitated by financial deregulation and globalization, political interference often causes--and almost always exacerbates--banking crises. If, for example, political authorities are allowed to pressure banking regulators into bailing out banks that should be allowed to fail, then regulation will lack credibility and market discipline won't work. Only by insuring the independence of banking regulators, Rochet says, can market forces work and banking crises be prevented and minimized. In this important collection of essays, Rochet examines the causes of banking crises around the world in recent decades, focusing on the lender of last resort; prudential regulation and the management of risk; and solvency regulations. His proposals for reforms that could limit the frequency and severity of banking crises should interest a wide range of academic economists and those working for central and private banks and financial services authorities.
Product Identifiers
Publisher
Princeton University Press
ISBN-10
0691131465
ISBN-13
9780691131467
eBay Product ID (ePID)
63850141
Product Key Features
Format
Hardcover
Language
English
Topic
Banks & Banking, Banking, Public Policy / Economic Policy
Publication Year
2008
Type
Textbook
Genre
Law, Business & Economics, Political Science
Number of Pages
320 Pages
Dimensions
Item Length
9.5in
Item Height
1in
Item Width
6.5in
Item Weight
20 oz
Additional Product Features
Reviews
Among economists' explanations are moral hazard, ill-judged capital adequacy rules and the incompetence of supervisors. Jean-Charles Rochet, a leading authority on banking, argues the real problem lies with politicians who too often insist on rescuing insolvent banks for short-term reasons of their own. [W]hatever the verdict on the policy proposals, the book makes interesting reading in current circumstances. ---John Plender, Financial Times, "Why are there so many banking crises? One answer is that so few economists of Jean-Charles Rochet's caliber have worked on the problem. Combining analytical and technical abilities, institutional knowledge, clear writing, and common sense to an outstanding degree, Rochet has produced a book that will benefit everyone who reads it." --Charles Goodhart, London School of Economics and Political Science, "This collection of important papers by Jean-Charles Rochet, one of the leading theoreticians of banking, should generate great interest." --George Kaufman, Loyola University Chicago, "Among economists' explanations are moral hazard, ill-judged capital adequacy rules and the incompetence of supervisors. Jean-Charles Rochet, a leading authority on banking, argues the real problem lies with politicians who too often insist on rescuing insolvent banks for short-term reasons of their own. [W]hatever the verdict on the policy proposals, the book makes interesting reading in current circumstances."-- John Plender, Financial Times, The book provides an excellent introduction to the theory of banking regulation. . . . I can recommend the book to anyone interested in a formal, academic approach to banking regulation. The concise conclusions of the individual articles provide valuable ideas for changes in banking regulation., Among economists' explanations are moral hazard, ill-judged capital adequacy rules and the incompetence of supervisors. Jean-Charles Rochet, a leading authority on banking, argues the real problem lies with politicians who too often insist on rescuing insolvent banks for short-term reasons of their own. [W]hatever the verdict on the policy proposals, the book makes interesting reading in current circumstances. -- John Plender, Financial Times, "The book provides an excellent introduction to the theory of banking regulation. . . . I can recommend the book to anyone interested in a formal, academic approach to banking regulation. The concise conclusions of the individual articles provide valuable ideas for changes in banking regulation." --Bernd Brommundt, Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, "Jean-Charles Rochet is one of the dedicated 'audacious pioneers' who have attempted to dissect with rigor, precision, and creativity some of the most elusive issues of financial (in)stability. It is pleasing to see his work presented in a unified, clear, and well-written form. A testament to his formidable contributions and remarkable insights, this book will guide researchers and students, as well as practitioners, into the future." --Dimitrios P. Tsomocos, Said Business School, University of Oxford, The book provides an excellent introduction to the theory of banking regulation. . . . I can recommend the book to anyone interested in a formal, academic approach to banking regulation. The concise conclusions of the individual articles provide valuable ideas for changes in banking regulation. -- Bernd Brommundt, Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, "Among economists' explanations are moral hazard, ill-judged capital adequacy rules and the incompetence of supervisors. Jean-Charles Rochet, a leading authority on banking, argues the real problem lies with politicians who too often insist on rescuing insolvent banks for short-term reasons of their own. [W]hatever the verdict on the policy proposals, the book makes interesting reading in current circumstances." ---John Plender, Financial Times, "The book provides an excellent introduction to the theory of banking regulation. . . . I can recommend the book to anyone interested in a formal, academic approach to banking regulation. The concise conclusions of the individual articles provide valuable ideas for changes in banking regulation." ---Bernd Brommundt, Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Among economists' explanations are moral hazard, ill-judged capital adequacy rules and the incompetence of supervisors. Jean-Charles Rochet, a leading authority on banking, argues the real problem lies with politicians who too often insist on rescuing insolvent banks for short-term reasons of their own. [W]hatever the verdict on the policy proposals, the book makes interesting reading in current circumstances., "Among economists' explanations are moral hazard, ill-judged capital adequacy rules and the incompetence of supervisors. Jean-Charles Rochet, a leading authority on banking, argues the real problem lies with politicians who too often insist on rescuing insolvent banks for short-term reasons of their own. [W]hatever the verdict on the policy proposals, the book makes interesting reading in current circumstances." --John Plender, Financial Times, The book provides an excellent introduction to the theory of banking regulation. . . . I can recommend the book to anyone interested in a formal, academic approach to banking regulation. The concise conclusions of the individual articles provide valuable ideas for changes in banking regulation. ---Bernd Brommundt, Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, "The book provides an excellent introduction to the theory of banking regulation. . . . I can recommend the book to anyone interested in a formal, academic approach to banking regulation. The concise conclusions of the individual articles provide valuable ideas for changes in banking regulation."-- Bernd Brommundt, Financial Markets and Portfolio Management
Publication Name
Why Are there So Many Banking Crises? : the Politics and Policy of Bank Regulation
Table of Content
Preface and Acknowledgments ix General Introduction and Outline of the Book 1 References 14 PART 1. WHY ARE THERE SO MANY BANKING CRISES? 19 Chapter 1: Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? by Jean-Charles Rochet 21 1.1 Introduction 21 1.2 The Sources of Banking Fragility 23 1.3 The Lender of Last Resort 24 1.4 Deposit Insurance and Solvency Regulations 27 1.5 Lessons from Recent Crises 28 1.6 The Future of Banking Supervision 30 References 33 PART 2. THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 35 Chapter 2: Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All? by Jean-Charles Rochet and Xavier Vives 37 2.1 Introduction 37 2.2 The Model 41 2.3 Runs and Solvency 44 2.4 Equilibrium of the Investors' Game 47 2.5 Coordination Failure and Prudential Regulation 53 2.6 Coordination Failure and LLR Policy 55 2.7 Endogenizing the Liability Structure and Crisis Resolution 58 2.8 An International LLR 63 2.9 Concluding Remarks 66 References 67 Chapter 3: The Lender of Last Resort: A Twenty-First-Century Approach by Xavier Freixas, Bruno M. Parigi, and Jean-Charles Rochet 71 3.1 Introduction 71 3.2 The Model 75 3.3 Efficient Supervision: Detection and Closure of Insolvent Banks 81 3.4 Efficient Closure 85 3.5 Central Bank Lending 89 3.6 Efficient Allocation in the Presence of Gambling for Resurrection 95 3.7 Policy Implications and Conclusions 97 3.8 Appendix 98 References 101 PART 3. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF SYSTEMIC RISK 103 Chapter 4: Macroeconomic Shocks and Banking Supervision by Jean-Charles Rochet 105 4.1 Introduction 105 4.2 A Brief Survey of the Literature 106 4.3 A Simple Model of Prudential Regulation without Macroeconomic Shocks 108 4.4 How to Deal with Macroeconomic Shocks? 112 4.5 Is Market Discipline Useful? 118 4.6 Policy Recommendations for Macroprudential Regulation 121 References 123 Chapter 5: Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk by Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole 126 5.1 Benchmark: No Interbank Lending 132 5.2 Date-0 Monitoring and Optimal Interbank Loans 139 5.3 Date-1 Monitoring, Too Big to Fail, and Bank Failure Propagations 148 5.4 Conclusion 153 5.5 Appendix: Solution of Program (P) 155 References 157 Chapter 6: Controlling Risk in Payment Systems by Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole 159 6.1 Taxonomy of Payment Systems 161 6.2 Three Illustrations 166 6.3 An Economic Approach to Payment Systems 173 6.4 Centralization versus Decentralization 181 6.5 An Analytical Framework 184 6.6 Conclusion 191 References 192 Chapter 7: Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and the Central Bank by Xavier Freixas, Bruno M. Parigi, and Jean-Charles Rochet 195 7.1 The Model 199 7.2 Pure Coordination Problems 205 7.3 Resiliency and Market Discipline in the Interbank System 207 7.4 Closure-Triggered Contagion Risk 210 7.5 Too-Big-to-Fail and Money Center Banks 213 7.6 Discussions and Conclusions 215 7.7 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 7.1 217 References 222 PART 4. SOLVENCY REGULATIONS 225 Chapter 8: Capital Requirements and the Behavior of Commercial Banks by Jean-Charles Rochet 227 8.1 Introduction 227 8.2 The Model 230 8.3 The Behavior of Banks in the Complete Markets Setup 231 8.4 The Portfolio Model 238 8.5 The Behavior of Banks in the Portfolio Model without Capital Requirements 240 8.6 Introducing Capital Requirements into the Portfolio Model 244 8.7 Introducing Limited Liability into the Portfolio Model 246 8.8 Conclusion 249 8.9 Appendix 250 8.10 An Example of an Increase in the Default Probability Consecutive to the Adoption of the Capital Requirement 256 References 257 Chapter 9: Rebalancing the Three Pillars of Basel II by Jean-Charles Rochet 258 9.1 Introduction
Copyright Date
2008
Lccn
2007-938554
Dewey Decimal
332.1
Intended Audience
College Audience
Dewey Edition
22
Illustrated
Yes
Item description from the seller
Seller assumes all responsibility for this listing.
eBay item number:335266338833
Shipping and handling
Item does not ship to United States
Item location:
60502, United States
Ships to:
Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Andorra, Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Azerbaijan Republic, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, British Virgin Islands, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde Islands, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), Fiji, Finland, Gabon Republic, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Grenada, Guam, Guatemala, Guernsey, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jersey, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macau, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Republic of Croatia, Republic of the Congo, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Saint Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Svalbard and Jan Mayen, Swaziland, Sweden, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vatican City State, Vietnam, Virgin Islands (U.S.), Wallis and Futuna, Western Sahara, Western Samoa, Worldwide, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Excludes:
Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belarus, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, France, French Guiana, French Polynesia, Germany, Guadeloupe, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Laos, Libya, Martinique, Mexico, Netherlands, New Caledonia, Reunion, Russian Federation, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yemen
| Handling time |
|---|
| Will usually ship within 6 business days of receiving cleared payment. |
| Taxes |
|---|
| Taxes may be applicable at checkout. Learn moreLearn more about paying tax on eBay purchases |
Sales tax for an item #335266338833
Sales tax for an item #335266338833
Seller collects sales tax for items shipped to the following provinces:
| Province | Sales Tax Rate |
|---|
Return policy
| After receiving the item, contact seller within |
|---|
| 30 days after the buyer receives it |
The buyer is responsible for return shipping costs.
Payment details
Payment methods
Popular categories from this store
Seller feedback (62,811)
c***i (257)- Feedback left by buyer.
Past month
Verified purchase
Fantastic seller! Great communication, fast delivery, secure packaging, item as described. Highly recommend!
r***3 (197)- Feedback left by buyer.
Past year
Verified purchase
Thank you to the seller for excellent ebay retail service in each and every way. Prompt response to sale and dispatch of the item described. Package received on time which was professionally packaged. Thanks .
t***r (262)- Feedback left by buyer.
Past month
Verified purchase
Multiple-repeat customer. As always, CD as described, for a good price, well packed and quickly shipped. Highly recommend.
Product ratings and reviews
More to explore:
- I Wonder Why Nonfiction Fiction & Books,
- I Wonder Why Nonfiction Fiction & Books in English,
- Charles Dickens Antiquarian & Collectible Books,
- Charles Dickens Books 1850-1899,
- Hardcover Nonfiction I Wonder Why Fiction & Nonfiction Books,
- Charles Dickens Fiction & Books,
- Charles Bukowski Antiquarian & Collectible Books,
- Charles Dickens Antiquarian & Collectible Book Sets,
- Charles Dickens Books 1900-1949,
- Illustrated Fiction & Charles Dickens Books